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1Attribution Theory
Attribution theory is concerned with the process by which people 
infer causation from "parts of the relatively stable environment"
(Heider, 1958*297)* This process is a function of the need to. control 
the environment through explanation and prediction similar to the way 
scientists attempt descriptions that render predictions. This analogy 
has also been drawn by Kelley (196?)» who has concluded that the way 
in which causal attributions are made is similar to the way data is 
analysed by means of the analysis of variance procedure. Another ex­
ample of the parallel between the scientific method and attribution 
processes has been made by Kelley (1971) regarding compensatory causes. 
These have been shown to be similar to the principles involved in scalo- 
gram analysis as developed by Guttman (1950), in that the underlying 
characteristics of action are examined and analyzed (see Kelley, 1971)* 
While the scientific method can be seen as a model of the way in which 
people make attributions, so too, the way in which people make attribu­
tions can be seen in the scientific method, though, the "naive psychology" 
(Heider, 1958) of the "man on the street" is less systematic. "A naive 
version of J. S. Kills' method of difference provides the basic analytic 
tool" (Kelley, 1967*19^)• The following illustrates this method using 
movies as the exemplary entity:
The. effect is attributed to that con­
dition which is present when the effect 
is present and which is absent when the 
effect is absent. This basic notion of
1. Compensatory causes take into account the possibility of multiple 
causality. That is, not merely covariation with the effect, but 
also degrees of each perceived cause when the effect occurs.
covariation of cause and effect is used 
to examine variations in effects (respon­
ses, sensations) in relation to variations 
over (a) entitles (movies), (b) persons 
(other viewers of the movie), (c) time 
(the same person on repeated exposures), 
and (d) modalities of interaction with 
the entity (different ways of viewing 
the movie). The attribution to the ex- 
. ternal thing rather than to the self 
requires that I respond differentially 
to the thing, that I respond consistent­
ly, over time and over modality, and 
that I respond in agreement with a con­
census of other persons' responses to it.
Kelley (196?) has developed a three dimensional model that visually 
illustrates the conditions set forth above. The three dimensions in­
clude: a) entities, b) time/modality, c) persons. Entities correspond
to things in the environment (in the example above, movies). Persons 
are divided into "self" and "others" and interact with the entities. 
Time/modality is that aspect concerned with responses to the same stimuli 
at different times and in different situations, under a variety of cir­
cumstances .
As stated above, attributions are based on the evaluation of dis­
tinctiveness, consistency, and consensus information. For Kelley (esp. 
1 9 6 7), responses of high magnitude over each of these variables results 
in an attribution to the stimulus "thing". Low consistency results in 
circumstance attribution (McArthur, 1972), and low distinctiveness and 
consensus accompanied by high consistency leads to a dispositional attri­
bution. The following chart illustrates these connections:
Evaluation
of
Information
Evaluation
of
Information
. 'V
Evaluation
of
Information
TABLE I
Evaluation of information 
for stimulus attributions
Distinctiveness Consistency Consensus
X X X
TABLE II
Evaluation of information 
for circumstance attributions
Distinctiveness Consistency Consensus
hi
lo X
TABLE III
Evaluation of information 
for dispositional attributions
Distinctiveness Consistency Consensus
X
’
X X
hi
lo
Kelley (1967) has provided a utilizable example which lends credi­
bility (face-validity) to the model. This example is concerned with the 
dynamic processes involved in persuasion and influence as these are re­
lated to the three dimensional model of causal attribution. This example 
is an extension of some of the work done by Thibaut and Kelley (19.59).
The first aspect of this example begins with -information dependence. 
"Person A is informationally dependent upon B if B can.raise A's level 
of information to a higher level than A can attain from alternate sources" 
(Kelley, 1967*199). Information dependence can be, like "outcomes" , 
objectively effective and desirable, but may also be subjective "in terms 
of anticipated or experienced effects" (Kelley, 1967*199). Thibaut and 
Kelley suggest that "objectively available outcomes" do not necessarily 
correlate with what is actually experienced or expected. Kelley (196?) 
similarly applies this notion of subjectivity to information dependence. 
For a participant to continue to engage in a particular behavior (e.g.
Information seeking) requires that the outcomes remain substantially
3*B.bove the "comparison level" and above the "comparison level for alter- 
' A
natives" . "Anticipated information dependence affords the basis for 
seeking information.....(and) we may expect persons to be dissatisfied 
with their information state when it falls below the expected level" or 
below the "CLalt"-the alternative being information seeking behavior in
2. "Outcomes" (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959) are cost benefit analyses of 
individual interactions*
3. "Comparison level" ("CL") is defined as an average of outcomes above 
which satisfaction results and below which dissatisfaction results 
(see Thibaut and Kelley, 1959*81).
"Comparison level for alternatives" ("CLalt") is the lowest acceptable 
outcome level for a person when that person is presented with alterna­
tives. When the outcome level is below the "CLalt" the social re­
lationship will be terminated.
this instance-(Kelley, 1967*199-200).
Person A will be more susceptible to 
influence the more variable his prior 
attribution has been. Attribution in­
stability (and hence, susceptibility 
to influence) will be high for a person 
who has (a) little social support, (b) 
prior information that is poor or am­
biguous, (c) problems difficult beyond 
his capabilities, (d) views that have 
been disconfirmed because of their in- 
* appropriateness or nonveridicality and 
(e) other experiences engendering low 
self confidence (Kelley, 1967*200).
Given.person A in the present state, and that B wishes to influence 
A, B may attempt to influence A on one of two dimensions of Kelley's 
attribution model. B may utilize either the consistency:or consensus 
aspects of the process. In the first case (operating on the consistency 
aspect of the attribution process) B may provide information which will 
aid A in achieving consistency over the time/modality dimension. This 
may be done through what Kelley has termed either "instruction" or "educa­
tion". In the second case (choosing to operate on the consensus aspect 
of the process) the pursuader (person B) provides information concerning 
his own or other's opinions. The difficulty in this second case of in­
fluence is that:
Person B's message is itself an effect, 
and A's problem is to attribute it, 
either to that part of their common 
environment under discussion (in which 
case it is considered valid), to B 
himself (his role, desires, etc.), or 
to the situation or target (A himself, 
the particular circumstances (Kelley, •
1967*201-202).
What attribution will be made by A, essentially what A will perceive and 
infer causality from for the message, the cause, will be determined by 
those factors mentioned earlier (A's evaluation over the distinctiveness,
6, consistency,; and consensus;• dimensions) .
Heider (1953) has also posited -a niirnber of - concepts, the experience 
and evaluation of which are deemed to determine the nature and direction 
of causal -attributions (i.e. whether or not the attribution will be made 
personally' or environmentally). Evaluation of, for example, information 
on the difficulty of the task, amount of effort, and. ability, are said 
to lead the attributor in making a causal attribution to either the 
environment or the person. Heider (1953s295) prox>oses that, "He try to 
make sense out of the manifold of proximal stimuli by ordering them in 
■ terms of the distal invariants and their relevant dispositional properties," 
This "ordering and classifying" is Holder’s concept of attribution.
Jones and- Davis (1965) hold a perspective of attribution .similar to 
Heider’s. These researchers have, however, reorganized some of the pro­
cesses that Heider set forth. Their*s is not an extension of Heider’s 
thought as much as it is a reformulation of the processes that Heider 
5 originally outlined. A brief look at the ’'theory-data.-model triangle"
]li developed by Leik and Heeler (1975) will aid in clarifying the similarities 
as woli as the differences between the thought of Heider, Helley, and Jones 
and Davis,
The "theory-data-model triangle" (TBHt) is a mathematical model develop­
ed for use in scientific endeavors. The purpose of substantive theory.is 
seen as the formulation of social variables into propositions so that social 
facts may be explained and predicted. Likewise, the purpose of developing 
a theory of causality for the; naive psychologist is to make explanation 
and prediction possible so that a better control over the environment can 
be achieved. -Two•modes or paths of analysis are discussed by Leik' and 
keeker who suggest.that these be labelled "inductive modes" and "deductive
.7
c
modes"'''. These paths of analysis of. the social -world axe deter mined .by 
the point at whJch one begins the analysis. The general propositions 
about the social world that make explanation and prediction possible, 
are contained within that point of the triangle labelled "theory".
For the naive psychologist this theory point may contain propositions 
about the social world that may take on the characteristics of axiomatic 
statements (e.g. stereotypes). The point at which observations are made 
is the data point of the TDMt. The point labelled "model” is, in the 
Leik and keeker formulation, not concerned with substantive material 
directly. "The model (point) is a set of statements in mathematical form 
involving abstract variables which may be-equated for theoretical purposes 
ifith substantive variables in whatever field is being examined" (Leik and 
Meeker, 1975s 10) . For the naive psychologist the model point may be 
qfmsid-ored: the formula that the-data is put into in order to make the nec­
essary ■analyses. The model includes all those pieces of information that 
the attritutor has come to know as indicative of causality and is consequent­
ly valuable for the purposes of inferring causality.
* For Leik and Tleeker, the deductive mode develops from an interaction 
between the theory and model points of the triangle, and then predicts to­
ward the data point of the triangle. This,may be illustrated as:'
theory ; model
data
II 'reductive LodeX «
5. These labels have been referred to as suggestions because they may not 
be ubiquitously accepted as induction or deduction.
8Alterna tively , the inductive liiode develops from the observation of 
empirical facts (i.e. the data point). The data point has an influence 
on the theory and model points of the triangle through interpretation 
and generalisation of the data. This process is illustrated in It,.
model
#
D9 Inductive'Mode
The specific processes involved in the deductive mode have been out­
lined, “by Leik and Meeker (jr. 10) as:
1 . Normalization of theory.
2i Derivetion of substantive interpretation of mathematical.patterns.
f. Mathematical prediction or extrapolation.
■'. Lubstuntive prediction.'
The processes involved, in induction are:
1. Mathematical generalization of theory.
2 . •Substantive interpretation of mathematical patterns*
3 . Illthstatical generalisation of empirical patterns.
A . Substantive interpretation of data.
Deduction bcginc -with a mathematical pattern of a particular sub­
stantive area (e.g. juvenile deviance, person perception, etc.) Once this 
mathematical pattern is developed from some hypotheses about the substantive 
area, a theory is formalised. .Mathematical predictions develop from the 
model point while ssubstant 3 ve predictions develop from the theory point 
of the TDMt.
oInduction has as its 'beginning a - mathematical general iz-ation of 
the observations made about the data. The • theory .point is the result 
of interpretations of the mathematical formulations. The data Is then 
examined and. generalisations and interpretations are made toward the 
'respective model and theory points.
'Cartwright and Horary (1956) have constructed a generalization of 
Heider’e balance theory (19AA). This formalization demonstrates the 
inductive process of Heiderian thought. The mathematical formula that 
Cartwright:and Karary•developed is:
b(C) = Cl-- (G). ■
G (G)
"whore b(c) is the degree of balance of a. graph G,
’ C+ (G) is the number of positive cycles of G, and 
C(G).is the total number of cycles of G."^
.1 substantive Interpretation of this -.mathematical generalization takes 
the form of a proposition (following the TDMt inductive mode) An exemplary 
i opo 3ition for balance theory has been- set forth by leik and Keeker (p. 7-3): 
"The structural balance principle states that people want to agree with 
their friends and disagree with'their enemies." The interaction between 
theory and model Is an ongoing process that operates to improve the theory 
and modify the-model. Indeed, Davis (1972) has develofjed the cluster model 
as a modification of balance theory* The cluster model has retained the 
assumption that people want to agree with their friends, but has discounted 
the proposition that people want to disagree with their enemies. "Instead, 
...people avoid getting themselves, into a situation in which there is a set
6. This formula Is contained in Leak and Meeker (1975)1 they add, "The 
measure b(G) Kill range between G and 1 and will equal 1 when G is 
balanced....(and) that amount of tension in the system will be propor­
tional to the degree of Imbalance" (p. 6l).
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o.u three people v/ith- exactly one negative r el at io 1 is hip" (Leik and Meeker, 
1975 i 6 7). Cluster theory pre curie s that there is only one imbalanced triad 
and that is one that includes one relative relationship and two positive 
relationships.
In the inductive process the impetus for the interaction between 
theory and model is the mathematical generalization of observations ("empiri­
cal patterns"J and the "substantive interpretation of data". The data 
for the Cartwright and Harary example is information about the positive 
and.'negative attitudes of persons involved in a set. of relationships.
To put the theory into more formal 
terms, begin by considering a set 
of-three persons... the theory 
states that for p to feel comfort­
able and the situation to be sta­
ble, if f Ilk os 0 ., 1 and- 0 should 
agree on their evaluation of O', 
either both.liking O' or both dis­
liking him. Then other combinations 
occur, the situation is unstable, be-* 
cause P will feel uncomfortable 
and tend to change his evaluations 
(I, a 11: an d kb e k 0 r, i 9 75 ’• 55) ■
The TDMt for Cartwright and Harary may be Illustrated as;
people want- to'agree 
with their friends and 
disagree v:ith the if 
enemies (theory)
b(C) - C+ (G) 
G~ Ic) 
^  (model)
(data)
information about the 
positive and negative 
attitudes of persons, 
involved in a set uf 
relationships
Theory Data Model' triangle of Cartwright and Harary
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The naive psychologist, as the attritutor has been referred to here,
operates from a TDht also. If the. schema presented above is an accurate
representation of the objective experience of the naive psychologist,
then- the naive psychologist may be subjectively represented as:
I should agree -with Is there tension
people I like and in this situation
disagree with' those (i.e. is it itribalaneed
I dislike .because this or unstable)
reduces tension -
(theory) 0^------------   (model)
(data)
1, evaluation of others 
in this relationship 
(positive or negative)
2, evalua/tions of. others' 
evaluations (positive 
or negative)
TDKt of the naive psychologist 
%  iliipiricct.l. support for the contentions contained in these models may be 
f found in Regan, Straus, and Fazio (197**)' who found that "good" actions are 
attributed to the dispositional quality of a liked, actor, while the same 
action is attributed to situational factors for disliked actors. Likewise,
"bad" actions of those whom the observer likes -are attributed to the' situa­
tion, while "bad" actions of disliked others are attributed dispositionally.
..-Heider recognised similar tendencies, for example, that persons would see
7others as either positive or negative in all. res|>ects .
Returning ty Holder's formulation of attribution theory, it is now
possible to analyze it in terms of the TDMt. At the theory point of the
triangle propositions such as, "man needs to refer observables to invariances
?. Studies on perceptual bias have focused on such concepts as the "halo 
effect" (Dion, Berscheid, and kalster, 1972) and the "positivity bias"
(Sears & Uhitney, 1973)» both of which derive in large part from Heider.
12
In' the f'nv:i r n / i i : i , "th.- und-'rl yi c; use of' event c i ’ y others 1
motlv.-.o, • the j nvarii anew" o f tin; environment", and "causes ore Cither
rersennl (intended or unintended) or impersonal", are contained, These 
propositions derive frori observations that, people make from their earliest 
experiences. The data for these propositions are contained, in what Heider 
has referred to as the "raw data", the data uolnt is modified, exporient- 
ial.iy bifurcated, in this attribution theory. On the one had there is an 
almost automatic assignment of causality to some part of the environment 
(either personal or impersonal), on the other, information such as' in­
tention, sentiments, ought, and. may, are weighed to be sure that the attri­
bution, is correct. The attributions! inference of causality Is inductively 
processed into the theory point, Feanwhile, other- information factors out 
luck and opportunity and leaves one with a model of the combined- effects 
of iffort,■ability, and the difficulty of the task. Heider (1 9 3 8) details 
this Process which is illustrated in D-s One must note that the function 
of the, triangle is to control the environment through explanation and 
prediction. Heider points out that action is determined or decided Upon 
bsseii on the inferences from observations .(both experiential ones and 
transmitted ones, e.g. books, verbal communication, etc.). Again the in-, 
ductive process is evident.
Propositions:
a) "e try to make sense out 
of the manifold of proxi­
mal stimuli by ordering 
them in terms of the dis­
tal invariants and their 
relevant diepositional 
properties.
b) causes are either personal 
or impersonal
c) man needs to refer ob­
servables to invariances 
in the environment.
Formula:
a) effort and ability are 
stable dispositional • 
es.
b) task difficulty is a 
stable environmental 
property.
c) luck and opportunity 
are environmental prop­
erties that affect task 
difficulty.
13
C.) the v./■©':1 yiny Caunc;;, of 
e v e n t ' ^  p scj l l?y rotiv_; 
o r otiiV'v, arc thu inva.- - 
lances of • the environment.
(theory) ^ ---  ^  (model)
j. ».UU Lxi’E-ci •
Impcrsor.al or information concepts;
personal cause u) can
bp trying
c) continents 
a) belonging 
Cy Qu.gi.vc and ray
D r. Inductive rude of bolderp
v
fLc theoretical process nuro is from observation to construction of
gcnir.a.lr cai j.givj m a t  ©nee<*spas e cxio uUT>a.. ncidcr sumnax’rly u.escx'xsoe In©
factors involved in this inductive process as follows:
Cf•special importance fur the inter- 
’ probation of the social world is the 
separation - of the xaetorv. located iii 
poaaonv, and tics,: the.I, br'.vfi their 
rourco err the environment of these 
pcraoxiis. ; any example l- of this impli­
cit "factor analysisM e-^ ro given, 
for instance, in Chapter 3» visibility 
of object as 'Loo personal factoij.ln 
Chapter h r difficulty cf tost. -vs. 
at:! 11 by; in Chapter. -desirability 
of object as the environmental and 
personal'. factors in '© n joy roar t; in 
Chapter's o, 1 0 , and 1 1 , tin factors 
fin 1 arc responsible fur what happens 
to Lie person; in Chapter ■ ■, objective 
retp virsv-'iouts sir1 personal si she;:; in' 
dhSpLr 7 , t1 . .factors naT-i.rp fox in­
duced action (13^°*?•??) •
’hl.Uy (1767) attonptei] to present systematically' the main points
u n h'ei:')cr*3 theory, and in addition shoT.r thuir relevance to social psychology
in general. Ho has discussed' the , coxrcepts,. with regard to" Heider, 
mentioned here, as well as a number of others that were used to show this, 
connection between social psychology and attribution theory, particularly 
as related to -motivation. Telley (1 9 7 1) points out that there is1 evidence 
of a schema that people use in attributing .causality. The types of causal 
schemata have been divided into:
9
1 . multiple sufficient causes 
2.. . multiple necessary causes
3 . compensatory causes 
h. effect 
f. graded effects
. Ifultiple sufficient causes are said to operate primarily for easy tasks, 
that is, when task difficulty is not high, Simply stated, ’’with the 
plausible external cause, absent, an appropriate internal cause is Intelred 
to be present; with the external cause present, the presence of the inlorn- 
al cause is cast in d o u b t , t h e  effect of the presence of one cause (for 
k^aiiiplc, the external one) is to render ambiguous the inference regarding 
the other cause" (helley, 1971*155)• For Heider too, the more influence 
that is attributed to environmental factors, the less influence there is 
to be attributed, to personal factors. For.more difficult tasks multiple 
necessary causes are considered. These causes are presumed to operate when 
there appears to exist more than one cause, but these causes are weak,
"The hypothesis can be proposed that the more extreme the effect to be 
attributed, the mdre likely the attributor is to assume that it entails 
multiple necessary causes" (Tolley, 1971*15&)• Both of these typos of causes 
assume that the attributor, our naive psychologist, is aware that more than, 
one factor is responsible for an outcome. To which factors, and consequently
• 15
whether a bituatioual or dispositional attribution will he made, some­
times not only requires that the factors be present or absent* but that . 
they bo present in certain degrees. This is the focus of compensatory 
causality. "In scientific practice, the schema appears in the form of 
Cuttman 's procedure fbr scalogram analysis. (1950), which affords'a 
scaling of persons- in .terms of the degree (to which they perform)" (Kelley, 
1971:15?) • The naive psychologist is able to distinguish to what degree 
causes must present in order for a particular effect to occur. These 
effects that have been referred'to here are also not only present or 
absent, but graded. The greater the effect, and as will be discussed in • 
the present research, the more serious the consequence, the clearer the 
inference that the causes present are present to a high degree. For Jones 
vand Davis, this is a highly significant aspect of their theory. They have 
, proposed'that the more negative the outcome, the more informative it is 
in terms of the attributes o f . the person (Jones and Davis, 19.65) >
1 Generally speaking, Jones and KcGillis (l976) point out that effects that 
/bare not common increase 'correspondent inferences (i.e. inferences about 
'b'the dispositional characteristics of the actor)» . Correspondent inferences 
have been defined by Jones and KcGillis as "a shift in expected valences 
so that the target, person is seen as desiring certain consequences more or 
less then.before the behavioral observation” (p. hi7 )•
•"elley (1971u) has categorized causation in yet another way; Causes 
may be facilitatevc, inhibitory, or contain a discounting effect. Facili- 
iativc causes are.,;tluse factors perceived to enhance the probability of 
the occurence of the effect, while inhibitory causes work against the 
occurence of the effect. Ability and effort may be assessed along this 
dimension. Also to be noted, is the role of discounting in the attribution
ID
process. • "Thu role of s. ^ivun cause .in producing a given effect is die-
counted if other plausible causes arc present”' (helley., i9 7la:^)» thus, 
with multiple causes' it is clear that the attributor may not, in fact, 
rnabe an attribution every time 'an action is’ perceived (see also Jones 
and IIcGillis, X 9 ? 6 )  , vJhen an inhibitory cause exists it requires that 
the facilitativo causes be much stronger, (at least in terms of the per­
ception of the attributor). Attributions to the disj;ositional or environ­
mental factors requisite for the occurence of an effect are thus dependent 
upon the causes discussed above (i.e. the causal schemata, discounting, 
facilitative and inhibitory causes, the "AaOVA .cube”, and the four attri- 
butional criteria of distinctiveness, concensus, and consistency over time 
and modality),'
From the information presented above it is now plausible that a TDMt 
be constructed .for fellc-y's theory of attribution.
dis L’ositi uial or Attribut-ional D ,
environmental Validity C+Cs
causer produce,
effects. ' where; I)~distinctiveness,
^-consensus, 
Cs=consisten.cy.
(theory)   ;___ ^  (model)
Q?+ Trelley's attribution 
° Theory
/ s '"elley (1 9 6 7 :1 0 0 ) has pointed out, "the person is concerned about the 
validity of an attribution regarding the environment, he opplics several 
criteria, in an attempt to rule out person-based sources or "error*' variance." 
As was presented earlier (p. 2 ), irelley perceives the attribution process
17
as one of elimination culminating in the remainder of the one plausible 
explanation. This is indeed a process of deduction,, from theory and 
model to data.
Jones and. Lavis (1965) supply an alternative TKDt• which follows
the inductive mode, foth Jones and I'cGillis (1976) and Kelley (196?)
conclude that their theories have different goals, While Kelley's
attributor attempts to rule out "person-based” factors, Davis and Jones
maintain- - that attributions are based on "person-caused variance”.
This .divergence betvreen the theoretical 
efforts is illustrated by the differences 
in dependent measures-used in experiments 
to test them. In the attitude attribution 
experiments testing correspondent infer­
ence theory, specific attitude or trait 
attribution scales - are used a.s dependent 
measures and subjects are requested to 
indicate the degree to which the target 
person possesses the given attitude or 
trait. Tn research to test Kelley's 
theory, on the other hand, dependent mea­
sures reflect the theory's orientation 
towards allocating causal attributions 
to either the person or the environment 
(Jones and KcGillis, 1!
a This divergence is shovm by comparison of the previous diagram (l^) with 
the diagram below that illustrates the major points of the Jones and Davi: 
inductive process.
people not constrained 
physically or socially 
(i.e. people with be­
havioral freedom) will 
■attempt to achieve de­
sirable results for 
their behavior,
(theory) ^
n t tr I bu t i o nal 
Validity: I = K+n+Ef,
where I.- intentions
- probable knowledge 
A = ability to achieve 
tlie co n s o qu. e n c s 
obsorveJ w 1 ien de­
sired
Ilf ~ behavioral .freedom 
(model)
consequences of behavio:
IV. Co2^ L’ospondent Inference Theory
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Hero, rather than looking for.distinctiveness, consistency, and 
consensus information within the data, the' attributor infers intentions 
from the consequences of the behavior. These intentions are paramount 
in the determination of whether the personal characteristics or the 
particular setting is responsible for the outcome.
Jones and Davis recognize that the consequences of any behavior are
many. These, are referred to as "multiple consequences'*. The. inference
of intention is complicated by this fact. However, once the particular
consequence is focused upon, the attribution to the person or the .setting
for that consequence is based.on the three factors listed in the model
(see D^.). A focus upon a particular consequence with a "noncommon effect"
is necessary because only those effects "provide a discriminating reason
for the choice".
Something in the combination of non- 
common effects chosen and foregone 
has. guided the. actor's behavior in 
the observed direction. As a first 
approximation, we might say that a 
dispositional inference is correspon- 
i: dent to the-- extent that an act and
t the disposition are similarly described
by. the inference (for example, "his dom­
ineering behavior reflects- ah underly­
ing trait of dominance") (Jones and KcGillis*
1976:391)•
Further intentionality information is contained in the assessment - 
of the person’s ability to achieve the consequence desired. If a person 
Is seen not to have the ability to achieve the desired consequence, then 
that person Will not be assigned intentionalitylikewise, intentionality 
rrquires that the person have the ability to foresee the consequence of 
the behavior ("probable knowledge"). "Attributions of probable knowledge 
are facilitated by any evidence that that the actor has the ability to 
achieve the,consequences observed when desired" (Jones and McGillis, 
1976:390).
Jones and ibcGillis (l9?6) have added to the Jones and Davis (196 5) 
theory of correcpondont inference theory. They wish to extend correspond­
ent inference theory from attributions toward strangers “based on one-time 
observations to inferences about persons that information is accumulated 
on ("Information .gain") . Jones- and KcGillis introduce two typer, of 
criteria that are believed to operate in the two different cir cumstancos 
(attributions to strangers and attributions to acquaintances).
Category-based expectancies arc those based largely upon normative 
information. Stereotyping .is an example of this type of expectancy for 
behavior. Target-based expectancies, 011 the other hand, pertain to infor­
mation gained about the particular actor and the influence of this Infor-. 
nation on the attributions made by an observer. Both of these typer of 
expectancies operate under the' influence .of the attributor's own theory 
of personality or behavior with regard to the expectancies for behavior 
from...the individual actor under observation. Category-based expectancies, 
however, are assumed to operate more in attributions toward strangers 
than.''in' attributions toward others that are familiar, Familiar others are 
subject to target-based expectancies for their behavior.
Jones and KcGillis (1976) have also attempted to show that felley's 
theory of attribution and correspondent inference .theory are conceptually 
similar. For example, parallels have boon drawn between target-based
0
expectancies and the distinct!venous and consistency variables. "If it 
were stated, that a sped Pic behavior was performed consistently in the 
same or similar settings, this could bo treated as either an.example of 
target-based prior probability manipulation or as equivalent to volley’s 
consistency over time and modality variable" (Jones and KcGillis, 197&)•
Distinctlyoness information has been cited as similar to targetrbased.
expectancies in that both o.f these operate from information on the actor's 
1 behavior in prior situations with similar circumstances and stimuli (bonos 
and: KcGillis-, 1976) . Jones and KcGillis have recognised that "the analogy 
between target-based expectancy and distinctiveness^brock down", however, 
they cling to their contonkJLon that, "The low~distinotivene-ss case can • 
be compared'to the high probability case of Jones et al., and the high 
distinctiveness case is comparable to the low prior probability manipula­
tion" (p. kQ9) .
A link has also, been established between consensus and category-based 
expectancies.
Consensus, according to Kelley, has. to 
do with voridicality, with the likeli­
hood that behavior Is caused by the 
situation or entity rather than the per­
son, If everyone likes the movie, then 
the movie and not its viewers must b e • 
the' prepotent causal factor. Trior prob­
ability variables in.correspondent infer­
ence theory are treated in much the same 
way: behavior in line with expectation
is nob informative concerning the person.
One only knows -that he is like everyone 
else. - by implication, that ho places the 
same value on the situstion in which he 
finds himself (Jones and KcGillis, 1 9 7 6 :6 0 8 ).
While the- attempt of Jones and KcGillis to show the similarity of 
purpose between Kelley's theory of attribution and the correspondent 
inference theory is commendable, much is.left-to be desired in terms of 
the conceptual linkage between the two, Though the parallel's between 
theoretical concepts may not be as veridical as Jones and KcGillis wish,- 
they have, contributed to the theoretical literature, which has traditionally 
not been well, constructed. The parallels that the authors have attempted 
to show.merely lay the groundwork for the major thesis, that Kelley's theory 
and correspondent Inference theory have potential for integration. In this
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light It is not so Important that the concepts "be shown equivalent, tut 
that the processes of the two "be set forth so that the important.aspects 
of each may "be considered under one theoretical tenet. While 'Colley's 
theory Is useful in providing; three elements of attribution (person, 
circumstance, or -stimulus), correspondent inference theory is designed to 
shot/ what factors cause particular attributions (Jones and KcGillis, 197&)* 
Py combining the two theoretical perspectives, Jones and KcGillis have 
provided the theoretical literature with a more complete theoretical 
construction- of what attribution theory Is. Their effort has helped 
fill the gap in theory construction.
The integrated framework to which I have referred here Is Illustrated, 
in flow chart form by Jones and KcGillis- (1976:411). They propose the 
following outline as depicting "The Conceptual Variables of an Integrated 
Attributional Analysis":
1, Prior probability variables 
-A. Category-based expectancies 
Type 1: Stereotypic 
Type 2: normative
I. Target-based expectancies 
Type Is Replicative 
Type 2: Conceptual replicative
4
Type 3 * Structural 
II. Koncoiwaon effect variables 
III. Knowledge.and ability variables
Throughout the analysis Jones and KcGillis recognise the important aspects 
of the'two theoretical perspectives, that correspondent inference theory 
is- concerned with establishing the cause of a single behavior and its
consequence -while Melley'e 'theory is concerned with the accumulation of • 
information and judgements based on past observed behavior. This 
integration lends itself to the construction of a TDMt that incorporates 
both'theories. .In retrospect, the integrated .framework for attribute orial 
analysis lends itself more to a mathematical 'model, than do 'the other 
"pure" theories of attribution. The integrated framework is not solely 
inductive or deductive as a result of the integration of the two "opposite" 
modes. As Leik and heeker have .pointed out, "Loth Inductive arid deductive 
modes will be. evident in the use of jnathematical models as well, with 
both modes appearing botween the model and substantive theory and between 
the model and the data" (1975:11-12). As will be demonstrated in the 
diagram below, this holds quite true for the integrated framework of 
attriLutional analy sI s .
Propositions s
1 . Lxpeetancies of 
behavior
a. category-based
b. target-based
2 . ... load to attribution;
of intention or emotion
j ... which in turn lead 
to inferences about the 
dlspoeItional properties
(Theory)
(data)
Observation:
Model, of analy si s 
Given: Intention ~ amotion
Iutontion Co nsIste ncy
Consistency = persistently 
striven for effects 
Intention - ffA+ff 
where,.M-knowledge 
inability 
Ef=behavioral 
freedom
(Model)
1. set or antieg in 
commerce with the 
' environment-.
2 . jjercoption of situation
a. -figural entity
b. bael; ground, co tit (.set
y. noncommon effects ancf ysi
a . of f c ct: •- cho; on
b. effects foregone
L0 . Integrated "Yurowox1 of Attributions.! .malysir.
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In addition to both modes (induction and deduction) being. proisent 
between theory and model, and between model and data* both1 modes are also 
present between theory and data for the attributor. Expectancies of 
behavior for future behavioral episodes arc *nflucresd by the observation 
of -the previous behaviors. At the same tine.,, 'observations have boon 
affected by the theory of personality that one holds. -This determines 
what particular expectancies will be held, both in terms of targets and 
categories.
The perception of the . situation, including' a noncommon effects 
analysis, is crucial in 'arriving at an attribution of intention or emo­
tion. Intention and emotion information Is also fed into the theory 
influencing future expectancies for- behavior, especially by. way of con si s- 
tency evaluati o ns.
The flow chart presented by Jones arid .VcGillis Is. much more linear 
in its theoretical perspective, -however. fimply shown,- the attribution 
process might look as follows:
I, drier ire lability III. ’hiowledge and ability
Variables Variables
(theory) ^ --------  (model)
(data)
II. ioncommon Effects 
Variables
I;c . dimple Integrated itramework 
./
And literally:
1. Observation-^ 2. boncommon effects analysis-►y* Prior Probability 
Analysis-^- b. knowledge d Ability validation-^-* 5* Intention vs. Emotion-
6 . Inference-^ 7. FeedbacrH^S. O b s e r v a t i o n .
Linear Integrated Framework
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The linear theory ha;:' been adapted to the TDft here and Bb) ,
j . u
however, duo to the theory’s "cotter fit" into the triangle then the
line. The linear analysis of the attribution process may, in fact, bo
an oversiiiiplif led version of the process. Tt is -felt that food tad:
from one point to another- is probably more common within the- framework
than is illustrated by the unidimensional illustration of the line between
"feedback" and "observation". By comparison of D, with JL, It is clear that
o /
the triangular model depicts this complexity in the attribution process 
more accurately. That is, the TDKt shows that feedback occurs through­
out the process and does not "play down" the importance of the Gestalt 
influence in attribution theory (see, for example, Header, 1946, 1953» 
'"elley, 19c?; Jones and bcGIllis, 1973). The linear method of analysis 
and illustration,, and its- consequent effect on theoretical thinking, docs 
limit "tiiis apparent Gestalt influence on the theory.
,2 till, Jones and McGillis (1976) • have made some strikingly import­
ant observations about research in attribution. Their attempt to bring 
correspondent inference theory and Tolley's "idCGVA cube" to terms has 
shown, the commonality of purpose amongst divergent perspectives in attri­
bution theory and research. This follows from -their position that many 
theories about attribution have been posited without any real attempt 
to establish an eclectic approach, as has been done, for example, In 
personality, and social psychology In general,
The attributional "flow chart" has provided this kind of eclectic 
framework'with which to work. The outline of this attributional frame­
work has added insight into how'people go about making attributions; here­
tofore not provided In the existing: theoretical literature. Jones and 
HcGillis (1976:418) have stated:
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The would-be attributor appraises the 
effects of the observed act and of plau­
sible- alternative acts, considers tho 
effects in terms of his prior expoctancies 
of people in general and the actor in 
particular, validates the Ino wl,edge-of™ 
effects assumption, and makes inferences' 
about intentions and ultimately more*
.stable dispositions. .These dispositional
attributions bocome expectancies influencing 
subsequent attributional inferences when 
more behavior by the same- actor is. observed.
Basically, this is the process that tho interactional framework follows
as presented in I),-.
5
Jones and hcGillis also point out that -their integrated framework 
should suggest areas of needed further research. The role of intention 
versus emotion is one such area. This Is an area with much potential-but 
little research; Snyder’s (1974) work has been t> le only research recognised 
by Jones and -TcGillis dealing primarily with this aspect- of 'attribution.
Jones and hcCillis (1976) recognise that, "In spite of the apparent com­
plexity of the flow7 chart, it is, of course, merely a series of sign posts 
that point to further complexities" (p. 4-1?).
Cne of the- complexities that these so-called "sign posts" point to 
is what- are the factors that affect attributions? Once discovered, are 
these factors differentially important, that is, do some factors account 
for (in frelley.’s terms) more of the variance ‘than do others? If so, how 
much? Clearly these questions pose more than one research endeavor, but 
in the next section an investigation into some of the research findings on 
what the factors are. will aid in .narrowing tho focus for the present research
2C
j UC oOX'S A_l footing tho attribution Irocess
A number of factors have been cited as highly influeiicial in ranhing 
attributions. Whether the attributor is mailing the attributions to the 
self or to others, - how serious the outcome and consoquencos of the situa.-. 
tion arc, and. how closely the observer identifies with tho actor are but . 
a few examples. In this section the various factors that affect what 
attributions will be undo arc discussed.
The factor having been Given the most attention in the current re­
search literature is the difference between- attributions made by the 
observer compared to attributions made by the actor.. Jones.and ITisbctt 
(1 9 7 1 ) have proposed that actors and observers have a natural tendency 
toward making different attributions. "Ue wish to argue.that there is 
apervasive tendency for actors to attribute their actions to situational 
requirements, whereas observers tend to attribute the same actions to sta­
ble personal dispositions” (p. f0 ),
Jones and hisbett have cited numerous research examples that support 
their contention. KcArthur’s (1970) study involved the presentation of 
information about a person to which the subject .(the observer) was to 
respond with an attribution to: a) the person, b) the stimulus, c) tho
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circumstances of the situation, or d) a combination of two or more of the' 
•reasons listed. The greatest proportion of responses were "purs person 
attributions" suggesting that observers' do indeed tend to attribute dis­
positional reasons for an actor's actions.
Jones and Tisbett (l9?l) have pointed out that a shortcoming In the-.
TTc A r 1 1 i u r  s t u d y  I ■; Cv t h a t  ILjfi.f 0!]_*j Job t i e n  a b o u t  t h e  a c t o r  h r  b e h a v i o r  ‘w a s  {gi v e n
(to observers only in printed, verbal forme" (p. 8 2 ). This artificial 
quality may have some Impact upon the.observers' attributions. This 
must be kept In mind.in research of this sort, however, this should not 
completely discount the importance of such studies.^ Ifc.Arthur*s (l9?0) 
study is said to "come very close: to being a direct test of the proposi­
tion that actors attribute cause to situations while observers attribute 
cause to dispositions" (Jones and Kisbc-tt, 1971:82), in that she compared 
the attributions made by 'an actor and an observer of the same situation.
Jones and hisbett (197-0 present two studies 'that are said to improve 
on the methodological (quality of actor-observcr experiments such as Mc­
Arthur's. These studios present the actor and the observer with more 
equivalent forms of information. The criticism of 'the printed, verbal 
format Is thus avoided.'
Hisbett and Caputo.(1971) utilised responses made by a subject as 
both an actor and an observer. Subjects were to write reasons for their 
having chosen their girlfriend and their major (actor.attribution), and 
secondly, why they thought their best friend had chosen his girlfriend 
and major (observer.attribution). The result was that when the response 
was from the actor's perspective attributions were phrased In predominantly 
.situational language., whereas when ;:the response was from, the perspective 
of tho observer (regarding the'best friend’s choice of girlfriend and
a
'major) the responses were phrased In predominantly- dispooitloiial language,
Hisbett, Legant, and. Mare cel: (19?1) had observers and actors respond 
to the same questions about a situation that both had. just experienced. Tin 
actor had just.been Involved in a situation where.he was offered either 
high or low payment, to volunteer to show visitors around the campus. The 
questions involved whether or not the actor's choice of action was a result
of dispositional qualities or something about the situation. It was 
found that observers were more willing than actors to infer dispositional 
reasons for tho actor's behavior. While actors attributed thoir actions 
largely to the situational requirements, observers were villling to infer 
-*hat the actor who- had volunteered in this situation would bo likely 
to volunteer in other situations too.
Jones and Hisbett (1971) 'conclude from this evidence that the reason 
for the variance between actor and observer attributions is two-fold:
a) actors and observers have different points of-view.
b) actors have more Information about thoir own past behavior 
than observers which usually shows his "nature" to be more 
situatiorally dependent.
In line with the "Integrated framework'" presented earlier (p, 22)
Jones and I-lsbott state that, "For the observer behavior is figural 
against tho ground of the'situation. ?or the actor it is the -situational 
ouosrthat arc figure1 art that arc seen to elicit behavior" (1971*93)• As 
the actor performs his behavior the observer so os the behavior as indica­
tive 'of the underlying stable dispositional qualities of the actor, while 
the actor tends to see his .behavior as a-reaction to the requirements of 
the situation. The availability' of more (target-based) information for 
the actor may be seen, as one reason why this occurs. The observer sees the
a
actor as part of the larger environmental situation. As a result, the 
behavior of the actor is more salient for Hie observer's "explanation and 
prediction" In his effort to control tho environment that sur?scunds him.
That actors and observers have a different focus of attention has also 
been investigated extensively (Duval, 19?2> Atoms, 1973; Ark in and Duval, 
1975; Duval and iionsley, 1976). In those studies the variance in attribu-
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lions between actors and observers are examined In ten is of their differ- 
cat informational perspectives (i.e. thoir different points of view;
Jones and l-Ticbott, 19?l) . Since the actor does not. see himself as much, 
as other stimuli in the environment his focus of attention Is said to bo 
on tne environmental factors, foesuse of this focus on the environment 
tho actor at tributes causality to environmental factors much more readily. 
This may serve as a sort of "self-fulfilling prophecy” In the methodology 
of the naive psychologist.
On the other hand,' the observer sees the actor as a dynamic figure 
In the environment. /rkiii and Duval (l9?5) -use -Toffka. (1936) as one way 
of looking at this. They Indicate that the.argument has been made "that 
Objects which have the property of being figure rather than ground 
are precisely those objects which attract the focus of attention”, Tho 
attribution of causality is a result, of the focus of attention. As such, 
it Is,; clear that the actor would tend to nake situational attributions 
while;: the observer would make dispositional. attributions.
Arkiil and Duval (1975) tested the focus of.attention hypothesis that 
is founded on the assumption that tho actor is figural to the observer. 
They contended that if this were.true it meant, that the observer must see
O
the actor as a "novel stimuli"^.
The results of the Arkin and Duval experiment support the notion that•
m
an 'novel stimuli, actors are the focus of attention, and as a consequence 
of this are assigned- responsibility.for causality wlth high frequency by 
observers.
o Derylno (1 95-8 ) has shown that novel stimuli gals attention. 
Attention, or the focus of attention in the present case, is linked 
to the attributions!. process. Thus, the focus'of attention will bo 
on novel stimuli, and these i.ov- 1 stimuli will be attributed with 
causality.
On a related topic, 2 liar or (1971) ■ found that observers may, under
conditions whore an accident has cccured, infer dispositional attributions
' o
as a means of defending themselves7 against the possibility that a si.ir.ilar
misfortune could happen to tho observer herself. Ahavor attempted to fin'd 
support for the proposition that: "An observer of an accident, -to- preclude•
the possibility that he could cause such.a misfortune, will attribute re­
sponsibility for its occurence to a person potentially responsible and 
will attempt to differentiate himself from that person; further, this 
tendency will increase with the probability of occurence and the severity 
of the accident's consequence" (-1 9 7 1 :1 0 1 ).
Defensive attributions, .it was conc3.ud.ed (Shaver, 1971), do operate, 
under conditions of severe consequences and personal similarity. Addition­
al evidence for - tho cor_t.r nil on ‘ that increasing seriousness of consequences 
.leads to dispositional attributions her' also been found by fainter (l>6 6 ) . 
..alster suggests that people apply stricter moral sanctions to persons 
attributed, with tho responsibility for causing a carious accident. In 
addition to tho increased tendency .to blame- persons for serious accidents 
rather than some envriomaontal factor, walster- (1 9 6 6 ) found that, people 
uish to attribute aN responsibility to someone in order to' reassure them­
selves that accidents do not "just happen".• If.someone is seen as responsible 
for the occurence of an accident, especially the victim, then the observer 
can reassure herself that such an occurence could not happen to her.
From the evidence provided here it seems that people not only wish 
to. differentiate themselves from "unfortune.to others", but also wish, to 
differentiate themselves from the possibility that "unfortunate circumstances" 
might befall them' (Shaver,. 1971; balster, 1966). feme studios' (e.g. Davis
9 - fhaver (1 9 7 1 ) refers to this a..; a "defensive c.t tri but!on".
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and Jones, i9 60 j Lerner end .Jiinmonr-, i9 6 0) have gone so far as to suggest 
that when one is seen as an ".innocent victim" that person will to' rejected 
by others as an undesirable person to justify the unfortunate occurence. 
r'orcovor, Lernor aid Latthovs (1 9 6 6) have found support for tho hypo­
thesis that when a person so0;; horsc-lf as respons.:i bio for an oH n u ’-perooc' 
fate, the person perceiving herself as responsible devalues the other 
person to justify that fate.
Lernor (1966) has developed this concept of a "belief in a just world". 
T.crner proposes that there arc only three causes for suffering .and that the he- 
are tho low worth of the person, tho person's behavior, and chance, '.'hen 
the person perceives herself as responsible for causing an unfortunate 
occurence to happen to another, the person attempts to attribute the occur­
ence to chance (something' in the situation). On th--. other hand, when that 
person sees herself as not responsible for inflicting suffering, and as a 
possible victim, chance is discounted as a possible reason for the occurence, 
father something about the persons involved are respcnsible for the occurence 
(e.g.i "she deserved uhat she got").- The latter ray bo seen as "the belief 
in a just world" and results, in dispositional attributions to others who 
"deserve it".
Alternatively, Shaw and Skolnick (1971) have concluded that perceiving 
another as experiencing "good fortune" will result in an attribution to the
a
situation by the observer. b'Len others' experience positive consequences, 
in order to enhance the subjective probability' that such a positive conse­
quence could, happen to them the actor is attributed less responsibility and 
chance or situational factors arc seen as responsible for the positive outcome
Medway, and Lowe (1975)' have combined the factors of severity and outcome; 
in thoir analysis of the attribution; process. They have found that, sovorily
of outcome, especially in the negative direction, Influences the attri­
bution of responsibility; to the actor1. Jupport was found for bolster's 
(ifou) conclusion that severe negative outcomes result in dispositional 
attributions, while mild outcomes novo tho attribution away; iron the 
person. In addition, the ego-defensive attribution hypothesis of 
shaver (1 9 7 0) was supported by the findings that, "h significant inter­
action of severity and outcome was obtained" (hed.way and- Lowe, 1 9 7 5 *
Pharos and Mil son (1972) -presented subjects with, a number' of court 
cases. Subjects .were to attribute responsibility based .on the information 
contained in the cases which varied severity and clarity. The findings 
suggest that the attribution of responsibility to the defendant is great­
est where the situation was clearly defined (structured), and the outcome 
of the accident was severe and "in a negative direction. Ihoroe and Wilson 
also point out that In the ambiguous situations "no relationship between 
responsibility attribution and severity of outcome (exists)" (p. t-OO) .
Then;..the situation is clearly defined, (structured) it is suggested that 
"judges" find It easy to determine who is responsible. This-' is not the 
case under ambiguous circumstances. I hares .and 'Wilson . conclude that there 
is a, positive relationship between the interaction of severity and clarity, 
and the attribution of responsibility to the actor.
I11 the study above it vras also found.' that Internals tend to attribute 
more responsibility to actors than do Externals. Developed by hotter (196 6 ), 
the I-h dimension.reflects the generalised expectancy of the observer re­
garding the cause of events, both good and. bad, that happen .to him. Collins 
(19?1) found, support for the notion that one would score external 011 Cotter's 
scale if he believed in a "difficult world", an "unjust world", a "'world 
governed by luck", or that tho. "world is politically • umre.sponxlve".
There is considerable evidence, however, 
that many of the conclusions reached by; 
an observer have more to ■ do vrith the ob­
server than the. stimulus person. Tornbusch, . 
hastorf, Richardson, hussy, and Vreeland 
(l9 cr) i for instance,■ repo.rted proater over­
lap among descriptions when they are (raxer- 
ated by the r-aip.e observer about different ■ 
people than when, tho descriptions ore goner-.
ated by different observers about the same
person (Collins, 19?': :?3i) .
The findings here indicate that the observer's own theory of person­
ality may influence the degree of personal rcsponc.il ill ty attributed., to 
an actor. Observers, because of their need to control (vrhich necessarily 
includes being "right") , may attribute responsibility based upon ’choir 
generalised expectancy for reinforcement of their own behavior. This 
would imply that, those who link reward vrith their own behavior (internals) 
would tend, to attribute responsibility to; actors in other situations. This, 
then, would be a result of. their generalised expectancy- for the control- of 
reinforcement '(Rotter, 1966). Tho 1hares and Wilson (1972) study, it must
ba. -pointed out, found that the I-hi diiaonsioe did not change the tendency
tower'd attributions based on the interaction between severity ond outcome, 
but merely enhanced the .extent to which the environment or person was held •. 
responsible for the consequences.
Anthony (1973) divided- subjects Into C-attritutors and I-attributors^.
The variables of identification, seriousness, and intc*ntionality were .
a
analysed in.terms of the two types of attributcrc. Subjects (attrihutors)
were' asked to read a story that involved a victim, a perpetrator, and•
manipulations of the seriousness, intentional!ty,. and - similarity to the ’
10. C-attributors and I-attributors may be defined as external and intornais&|^ 
(as per hotter, 1 9 6 6 ). C-attributors are those who tend to'atiribut^Ji' 
the cause of-events to circumstances while i-attributors tend to. attri­
bute the rc sponsibility for outcomes of si buatiens to' tho behavioip-'di 
persons involved. This is in line'with the generalized expectancy 
inf or one • rrndo above, that those - who see .their own behavior as producing 
rewards also see others as responsible for tho outcomes of their tchavi or
34
actors. The results showed that C-attributors who identified .with the 
victim attributed more responsibility to the perpetrator when the' out­
come was serious and attributed less responsibility to the perpetrator 
when the outcome was not so serious, or mild. C-attributors who identi­
fied with the oerpetrator assigned responsibility to a greater extent un­
der less serious outcomes than under serious outcomes. I-attributors who 
identified with the victim were found to assign "minimum ,AP (-attribution 
of responsibility) in the less serious-unintentional outcome" (Anthony, 
1973:89).
Interactional Fffects of Attribution 
The research findings and the theoretical literature (especially 
that of IIeider, Kelley, and Jones and Davis) have been shown, to be 
consistent. Factors that have been found to. influence the nature of 
attributions have been researched, and. this research has shown that whether 
an attribution of personal responsibility or that■something about the 
situation will' be held responsible for the perceived deed is dependent 
upon: 1) the perspective of the attributor,
Z) the severity of the consequmces.
3 ) the clarity of the situation.
4 ) the personal, relevance to. the actor.
5 ) the personal•characteristics of tho attributor.
That there is a ocrvasivG tendency on the wart of actors to make situa- 
tional attributions and for observers to infer dicpositional causes, and 
thus responsibility, has boon well established (Jones and usvis, 196p> 
Arthur, 19?0, 1972? Jo has and Nisbott, 1971 ; Fisbott and Caputo, 1971; 
hisbett, T egant, and ''arecok, 1971). The reasons for this occurence are not 
as well established, however. Como (e.g. Jones and hisbett, 1970 indicate 
that the different informational perspectives are responsible for this-
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variation. They- have suggor.tod that the actor's behavior in figural against 
a situational ground, while the. actor seed tho situation an figural in 
hc-r process of analysing and. attributing responsibility. Arkin and Duval 
(1 9 7 5 ) explain this process similarly an tho difference in' the focus of 
attention. Ua] at or (19-55) and Dhavor (l9 ?i) have erpl. o.ned. tho occur once 
from a more psychologically based orientation. They surest that the reason 
for tho observers tendency to attribute responsibility, especially for nega­
tive outcomes the results of which are severe, to the actor is centered 
around the•observer's need to dissassociate herself from the actor. Dy so 
■doing the observer rational isos that such an outcome would not happen to her 
because she is somehow different than the actor. Lerner (1 9 6 6 ) has produced 
a plausible ideology behind this kind of.process, he indicates that peoplr 
believe in. a' "just world" and that people got what they deserve and deserve 
what they ret. This being the ca.se the observer can simply rationalise that . 
since they deserve better outcomes', negative outcomes such as the or,os that 
they 'Observe will not befall them. Alternativelybhaw and bkolnic:: (l9?i) 
found.''-that, as might be expected, - when good fortune happens to someone the 
attribution by the observer is 'made to the situation. This • in-1 icotes that 
the good fortune has just as much probability of happening to the observer 
. as- to the actor, at least -as far as the observer-is concerned.
hot only does the pcsitivity or negativity of the outcome sway the attri-
*
button of tho-observer, so too docs the severity, cr mildness, of the conse­
quences of the action, hedway and Lowe (1975) have found substantial support 
for this interaction between severity and outcome. If the outcome is severe­
ly negative the attribution by the observer toads to bo highly dispositional, 
On the other hand, a - severely positive outcome would preclude, a dispositional
T-TilcI. consequences for either a positive or a negative; outcome scows 
to present the observer with some ai'iblguity in regard to' what to at-tri­
bute the occurence of a deed to. As pharos and './II son. (1972) have 
shown, there seems to be no relationship between the severity of the 
consequences- for an outcome and tho attribution of recponciblJ ity when 
an ambiguous situation arises, then the situation sobus•clearly defined 
to tho observer, however, the attribution of responsibility seems to be 
greatest, assuring that the conditions of .severe consequences and a 
negative outcome are met.
There has been solid evidence (shaver, 1971; talc ter, 19 6 6) that suggests 
the perceived similarity to the actor has an influence on the attribution 
of responsibility, ouch factors ac sex, ago, and the perceived likelihood 
that a -similar situation could occur to the observer, are f ac Lars that have 
been investigated as ego-involving. The involvement of the ego in making 
attributions may account for the defensive attribution process that fhaver 
nas demonstra'cea,
•hotter (i9 6 0 ) and Collins (197-0 have developed the concepts of Internal 
and External general -expectancies for the control of reinforcement. These 
are assumed-to operate in "different types of people". Those who score 
Internally on Totter's (1966) scale arc believed to generally attribute 
responsibility to persons, while those who score External are believed to
a
see the world as - governed by luck, unjust rewards, and political unrcsponsive- 
ness (Collins, 19?*’0 • The* converse of these assumptions are also held as 
true by Collins.
Anthony (1973) has also pursued this' line of reasoning In her research 
on the perceptions and attributions of people she defines as C-attributor3 
and I-attributors. 3hc has . .1 nvosttgntod the 'Impact .of these pure or, ell ty typer
3?
Id. cgd junction v.’tL the attributor’s identification with the perpetrator 
or victim of a. crime. Her findings support the notion that those person­
ality and social factors have a predictable impact 021 the direction of 
.attributions.
Together, these research results lead us to the conclusion that many 
factors acting in concert direct attributions in one of two directions, 
cither toward.' the dispositional or situational end ox the attribution spec­
trum. It would, seem certainly erroneous to assume that those factors that 
have been researched and discussed, in this paper make up the whole range 
of factors that influence attributions. Even if these factors were to be 
considered, as all the possible influenci&l factors in the attribution pro- 
ec:::.s, their interactional effects have not been determined.
Clearly, research on the attribution-process is faced with the task 
of.bringing-to light the many other factors that influence attributions.
It is the purpose of the present research, however, to look at the inter­
actions of 'those factors that have- been sbovin by previous research to have 
a definite affect on the attribution process. Through the discovery of tho. 
interactional ■ ef fee is of those factors ' so:;-;? hypotheses regarding other 
factors ms.y be developed.
The previous research on attribution has determined that variables 
such os outcome, severity,- clarity, and -ogo-invoi voment"have, 'a pre­
dictable influence on the direction of attributions. This study will 
see’; to assess tho Interaction of these factors. This is necessary in 
light of the fa.c;t that research an to now has failed to • do this. How 
tho clarity of the situation, the nature of the outcome, and the sever­
ity of the consequences interact will be examined. It had been hoped 
that these conditions could' be examined under both ego-involved and 
non-ego-involveu conditions, however, not enough subjects in the present
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felt that, the situation .was -personally relevant to give reliable 
results. As a result, this aspect of the research was aborted in the 
analysis of the data.
Hypotheses
F r o m . t-he. research findings one .might arrive at the conclusion .that
the outcome of a -specific situation, as perceived by the observer, is
very important in terms of influencing-the observer in either a situa- 
#
tional or personal direction. ,lo too, however, are the’.severity of 
the consequences for this, outcome, negative outcomes would, seem to 
be most influ.encia! and these outcomes would result in a personal 
attribution.; Thhsb two factors are further .complicated when 'the conditions 
.of ambiguity and clarity are introduced. These latter two conditions 
seem to influence the attributor, not so much in the specific attribution, 
but rather in the. degree of confidence with which the attribution is made. 
That is, since the person is figural against the. ground of the situation., 
and a clear situation would seem to produce a more confident state in 
the attributor, then a clear situation will be met with relatively great­
er attribution to the person than an ambiguous situation. In addition, 
it is expected that severe consequences will elicit more extreme respon­
ses than mild ones.' H cgative outcomes will be assigned more personal, 
responsibility and positive outcomes wi 1 1 be assigned.'situational- respon­
sibility. Furthermore, ■' 'when a. .situation appears clearly defined, the 
attribution- of responsibility should reflect this by being further 
in the cJisqositj oral direction than tin* ambiguous situation containing 
the same vari ablr .conditions . for outcome and severity. ’ Tho. specific 
hypotheses., may. -b ranl-r ordered to illustrate the variance in relative 
mag.nitucle of the attribution as follows:"^
I . If the conditions o f ’ a situation arc ambiguous, with severe con­
sequence's ' for a positive .outcome, then, the attribution* of rosqon-
II. Those • hypotheses are ranked according to increasing amounts of
i  -■ ■; v > - i  * -1 ! t t  s h i  •
sibility by on observer will b- , re1 ative to the other combinations 
o f t hosc variab1os , least.
2. t. f the conditions of a situation are clear, with severe consequences 
for a positive outcome, then the attribution of responsibility by. an 
observer will be, relative to the other combinations of these variables, 
second least.
3* If the conditions of a situation are ambiguous, with mild consequences,
for a positive .outcome, then the attribution of responsibility by an
observer W i l l  bo, relative to the other combinations of these variables, 
third least.
'f. T f. the conditions of a situation are cl ear, with mild consequences for
n positive outcome, then the attribution of responsibility by an observer 
will bo, relative to tho other combinations of these variables, fourth 
least.
5. If the condition’s of a situation are ambiguous, with mild consequences
for a negative outcome, then the attribution of responsibility by an
observer will be, relative to the other combinations of these variables, 
fourth most.
6. I.f the conditions of a situation are clear, with mild consequences for
a negative outcome, then the attribution of responsibility by an observer 
will be, relative to the other combinations of these variables, third 
most.
7. If the conditions of a situation are ambiguous, with severe consequences 
for a negative outcome, then tho attribution of responsibility by an 
observer will- bo, relative to-the other combinations of these variables, 
second most.
0. If the conditions of a situation are clear, with severe consequences for 
a negative outcome, then the attribution of responsibility by an observer 
will be, relative to the other combinations of these variables, most.
liQ
' The so hypotheses are based on empirical a r,Gumptions. Following 
from Keider, thcro exists an inverse relationship between the attrib­
ution of personal responsibility and the attribution of situational 
responsibility. That is, the attribution to the person is not exclusive 
of all' attribution to the situation, rather one dominates the other. 
This would suggest that there exists some proportion between dis­
positional and. situational responsibility, Ileid.er's balance theory 
may have had some impact upon his thought in terms of attribution, 
theory. That a proportion between situational and dispositional 
attributions exists involves an assumption of balance between the two. 
It might be suggested that the fraction of situationally attributed 
responsibility is equal to one minus the fraction of personally 
attributed rossensibility in any one given situation. The inverse 
of this- equation would ' also hold true.
r''ther support 5may be found for the order of the hypotheses 
in  7 sister’s (1965) research that found people making dispositional 
attributions of res a. o n si bi 1 i t y for negative outcomes, es peci a 1 l y ' when 
cons 'quences v.xro suvore, and alternatively found that pconl e ere 
nrediseosed to making'situatj onal attributions'when outcomes are 
positive. 1 hav and Tho Ini cl. ( 1971) found similar results, that when 
I1 good fortune” hapoens to an actor the situation (chance) is held re­
scan sib lo for the occurence to ’'increase tho likelihood that similar 
good fortune could hancon to th^m”.
'I
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Tho outcome, of John’s pro e: ration was indicated in the ensuing 
paragraph • which contained, either information that the outcome was: 
positive;
1. The actual midterm examination consisted of three essay questions, 
all. of which John had previously prepared thoroughly and as a result 
he received an' A.
or negative;
2. The . actual, midterm examination consisted of three essay questions,
'none of w h i c h  John had previously prepared thoroughly and as a result
he received a I). x
The final paragraph described the consequences of the grade John
or Joan.received. All subjects road:
In addition to the midterm examination 
"a ten page research paper was required of 
all the students in the class. This profes­
sor has been known in past classes to delete 
or add bagos to the research paper depending 
on the outcome of o n e ’s grade on the midterm*
The final sentence stated the severity of the consequences as being:
severe for the negative outcome;
1.1 Since John received a D on the midterm examination he had to turn in 
a twenty-page -research''.paper. .
‘mild for a negative outcome;
2. Since John received a P on the midterm examination he had to turn in 
a fifteen page research paper.
severe for a positive outcome;
3. Since John received an A on the midterm .examination he only had to 
turn in-a two-page typed bibliography.
m3.1 d for a positive outcome;
4. Since John received an A on the midterm examination he only had to 
turn in a five page research paper.
"u'-jj'-'Ct-
sc.vr n  u n d e r g r a d u a t e  s t u d e n t s  e n r o l l e d  i n  i n t r o d u c t o r y  
s o c i o l o g y  a t  tly’ TJnj.vernj.ty o f  Tie b r a  s k a  a t  O n  a h  a  s e r v e d  a s  vol. u n -  
..1 c e f d  f o r  . e x t r a  c r e d i t .  r’estc; w o r e  y.rbnj- n i s t e r c d  i n  s m a l l  c r o u p s  o f  
■from s i x  t o  f o u r t e e n  p e r s o n s  o n  a sc h ec l ul  od b a s i s ,  t n  a n  a t t e m p t  t o ’ 
r e d u c e  v a r i a t i o n  b o s  or. o n  s o x ,  al o. s u b j e c t s  r o a d  s t o r i e s  a b o u t  a
r
male target person (John) ' v/hil e female sub jects read stories about 
a fen ale target err son. (Joan) to accomplish this. The statistical, 
analysis indicates that this reduction was successful in that a sig­
nificant .variation based on sex was not approached (F=0.C9t df-7/260).
Subjects answered each of four questions on a seven point scale 
•and this sca’i e found quantitative basis for analysis. Oucstion 1 ("Tas 
what ha "pened. . . positive or negative?”) v/as rated from ’’very negative" 
(1) to "very oositive" (7). Question 2 ("Should' John or Joan have ex­
pected tho consequences?") was rated fron "should not have expected 
•the consequences" (1) to "should have expected the consequences" (7). 
Question 3 (."Hew much- effort... put forth?") was rated from "very 
little effort" (1) to "very much effort" (7). Question /+ ("How re-' 
sponsible was John or Joan...?") was rated 'from "not at all responsi­
ble" (1) to "very responsible" (7). V/hil e questions two and three 
v/ero only tangential.Iy related to the 'experimental design, they did 
serve to disguise the attribution of responsibility question as being 
the essential question of the study. These two questions will not be3 
elaborated on hero, but it was expected that the mean for the attribu­
tion of responsibility would bo -approxiraated by the mean for expectancy. 
That is, one is not expected to foresee consequences that one is not 
responsible for, but when one is held responsible the ex'oectation that 
the ■ ' rson should '.fores ?o the outcome and consequence s is ore sent.
kh
In addition ,• effort shouJ d also fo] lov this pattern an it in an in­
formation source about the disposition of tho actor (loir’er, 1958).
The scans for ox^oc tancy, effort, and tho-' attribution of r^; s'onsibi1 ity 
fire rresented for comparison ur.d for re r*:roncr by future rosearchors in 
Table TV (papo /;!?).
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?VAULTS 
■TABT.r IV
Comparative means for effort, 
expectancy., and the attribution 
of responsibility
Story V 1 2 3- 4 5
.■ r 
' o 7 0o
Conditions A'SB •csr’ A v;- C»'B' c yrr API! csr
'••f fort 4. 37 4 . 0 6 4.97 5.35
c\jIN• 4.-72 5.48 5-56 .
Expectancy ' 4 . 0 0 3. 35 4-. 54 3.82 5..C3 4.29 3.84'. . 3.61
A.o.ji, 4 .43 4.53 5 . 2  V 5.41 4.51 4 ..17 5.41 5.58
• Question 4, regarding; the attribution' of responsibility, was 
expected to produce results which would support, or lead to- a. ro- 
j.ect.lon of the hypothesized order of attributions o.f responsibility 
to the person or situation. Table V indicates' that no single variable 
maiii.-.’effects were -present at a statistically significant level,
TABU” V
I'eans and standard deviations 
for main effects
Conditions . means stand, devs. t-scores df
C1 ear X=4.9-2 sd=1.99
Ambiguous 7=4.39 sd=2.4 5 ;t=.109 d f=264
Kild 7=4.32 sd=2.47 t--. 5 19 ■ df,,p64
Severe 7=4.99 sd=1.91
positive 7=4,89 sd=1.93 t=.103 . d f=262
Negative X=4.92 sd=2.52
4-b
The .introduction of yolyvariates into the analys’i s procedure 
does result in some statistical by significant scores, Tab? e 7 T 
shows the means and standard deviations, alone .with t-scores, for 
the polyvariate analysis' combining; two variables:
T 1  . VI
Me-ans and. standard deviatio11 s v;ith t~scoros 
for two variable analyses
Variables ■r-. s d
0 1  ear/; .'I Id 
C 1 o c.r/■■' e v er e
A. 79 
3 . o 6
e r*
1.07
t — 2 , 2 0 (?<.05)
A m b i g uous/riId 
A m b i i; u o u s /.9 ever A.
A 106 
A. 97
2 .p0 -
1.97
t.-.. . 1 i p
0 1 o ar /"' o s 1 1 1  y e- A. 99 1 . 0 2 t ~ . 0 9
C" rar/9 ogativr A . 97 • • O’ y .
A m b i g u o u s / V' o s i t i v ■ 
.1 nbiguous/?TegatI vn
A . o 1 
A - 97
2 . 0  9 
2 .0 A.
t - .972
1
I ;i id/positive 
Fild/m c gative
9.91
1, T.r}* t- •. . 'r
9 . 0 0  
i. 70
t = 2 . 10
:
(■m.0 5 )
' everc/positive 
A e verc enative
A • -
. 90
0 n r.
1 n C\ t = 3 ,29 ( '’<.0 1 )
Here, throe comparisons -provide statistical iy significant results.
Vetv/een the clear and mild and the clear and severe-- conditions there is
a significant difference. Again when we compare the mild conditions
*
across the positive and negativ . outcome variablo there is a significant 
t~score. Finally, vjhen comparing the severe consequence condition across 
outcomes, a strong significant difference is obtained.
Interestingly, when all throe variables are included in tho test 
for significance a greater number than that above .emerge as significant.. 
Table VII shove the bo tv/con groue t-scoros whil-' Table VIII contains 
the levels' of significance for i'ho t-scorns in e VTT .
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•As can bo .seen in Or an h i  (bolov:) , it a n ; oars that, an interaction 
has occured between - outcome and consoquoncos.
Graph I
Interaction between outcome and. consequences as 
indicated by the attribution, of rns eon nihility
PT.1 AO
Ou e i j. 
( API?)
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Here the greatest mean .attribution of responsibility was for 
the clear, negative, and severe, condition; This is in line, with the 
order.;,of the hypotheses. .’Ambiguous., negative,.and severe conditions 
were -also consistent with the order of the hypotheses as this condition 
received the second highest attribution of responsibility. The condition 
W h i c h  included mild and positive variables under a clear situation 
was not in line with, the hypotheses. It . received t h e ■same amount of 
responsibility assignment as did the ambiguous, severe, negative condition 
The ambiguous, mild, positive condition received the next greatest 
amount of responsibility assignment to the person'with a mean of 5 *2 1 . 
Unexpectedly, the positive and severe condition in the clear situation 
received the next highest attribution of responsibility,, placing it 
fifth on the rank order list as opposed to last as hypothesized. The 
ambiguous, . mild, and negative condition., with a mean of .^.5 1 * received 
less attribution of responsibility than had been expected. In t h e • 
ambiguous, severe,, positive condition the assignment of responsibility '
'+9
v:ac closer to the expectation as the mean of h -h3 rankod second lov/- 
ost, proceeded in l east attribution of rospon e ± hi 1 i ty only by story 
number six (6), the clear, mild, and negative condition. m his so-ms • 
quite unusual, however* rro.'n the proeoadi n y , the • -order, by -story, of 
the attribution of .to,s :'onsibi T j ty v;-: :::
rn A "p T •-> -y - -
C o m u c T . r a t j . v o  r a n l . - o r d . e r  o f  s t o r i e s  b y  
h y p o t h e s i s  a n d  a t t r i b u t i o n  o f  r o o ^ o n h i b i 1 1 t y
('  r  d. r *  c< t  r < r v  d r <  n  d i  1 1. o  n s  °  a n ! —o *vd
7  7 v r' '
*• ihiriled fro':.", one (1 east' to eight (most) attribute -n 
of raspsnsibi1ity direct-d toward tie- .actor.
" u e s t i o n  1 ,  c o n c e r n ' n  h- - v :  - t h e  s u b j e c t s  ~ c o i v e d  t h e .  . - t o r ; *  w  
i n  t e r m s  o f  p o s i t i v e  o r  n - s a t i v ^  o u t c o m e s , v v - s  u s e d ; ' -  P r i e s  r i i y  a s  
a  v a l i d i t y  e h r .  o k  f o r  t . h e  e t c r i - s : . .  T t  v:a : , s s :  c t  1  • t h a t  t h w  w  e - i s° 0
for outcome in if A  b. n ■■-'ati v H  y corroi star1 t. 1 the- ■ ? t tribut icn e 
res'onsibi“ i ty. That its, : e th.-- attrhbut• an of res s nsibility i .■ 
observed W  i n • reuse, the u t c c  ptiou of the on ten;::c- as n-.q;ativ" 
would be oxoacted, to iiicr .roe (or, the. rating- on the or- to s s s m  
scale, should ro floct lower scorer; as the rati p cn 'nm r-n.tior. t 
b e c o  . • \ ■ r • • • -t ■ !'• OS 11* rev n  : T.h, ; c a . e) .
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A. brief look at the means and standard deviations in comparison 
to the responses for the attribution of responsibility does not read-, 
ily indicate whether: or not there is a relationship between the per­
ceived outcome and the attribution of responsibility. Hoy/ever, a 
statistical test of significance Indicates that there was a very 
strong difference between groups in which the outcome of the stories 
were positive and stories in which the outcomes were negative - (■ t- p. 2 0 , 
df--,?6h,:;p .001). These findings suggest that the outcome manipulation 
was effective and that subjects did discriminate between stories with 
"positive outcomes” and"stories' with "negative outcomes".
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!.;is cushion
'.Va.i fiter ( 1 cjC6) found that the attri but Ion o f ' resr,cnsibi.Ij ty 
to an actor increased as .the severity of the consequences, for a 
negative outcome increased, the concluded that an obs<rvor may foci 
sympathetic for an actor when an occi demit resul ts in a mild c o n s equence, 
but -will not when the consequences are severe, 'then the consequences 
are severe, fainter suggests that the observer will attempt to attri­
bute the consequences to the person. Fot to do so would be to admit 
that an equally negative consequence- could .happen* to the observer.
By attributing the rcsponsibility to the actor, however, it reassures 
the observer that similar undesirable consequences will not happen 
to her or hi:::, and that the actor .•■not b-,. a Mdiffcrontfsort of .ocr- 
S O i d 1,
; o d w a y . a n d  T o w e  ( 1 9 7 5 )  a l s o  c o n d u c t e d  e x p e r i m e n t a l  r e s e a r c h  
e x a m i n i n g  t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n  o f  t h e  s e v e r i  t y  o f  t h e  c o n s e - ' u p n c . s  a l o n g  • 
w i t l w t h e  n a t u r e  o . f  t h e  o u t ' c o m r . -  ( p o s i t i v e  o r  n e g a t i v e ) .  T h e i r  f i n d : ]  r e m -  
s u p p o r t  T a l s t e r  * r. (  1 9 6 6 , ) ’ r e s e a r c h  a n d  t h e y  c o n c l u d e  t h a t  i n c r e a s e d  
s e v e r i t y  w i l l  i n c r e a s e  t h e  a t t r i b u t i o n  o f  r o s r s n s i b i ! i t y ,. i n  e l  t h o r  
p o s i t i v e  o r  n e g a t i v e  s i t u a t i o n s ,  a n d  ' f u r t h e r m a r e ,  t h e  s o l  f - d  f o n s - i v e  
h y o o  t h e s i s  t h a t  s t a t e s  t h a t  . p e e  t e n d  t o  b l a e w ;  o t h e r s  f o r  r r p g a  t j  v o  
o u t c o m e s  w a s  r i v e n  s u ;  a r t .
r t h o r  r e ; a " a r c h e r s  ( - . vl .  e r e s  e n d  ' ^ i l s e r - l  h a v e  f o u n d  t h a t  t h e ­
e l  a r i t y  o r  a m b i g u i t y  o f  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  h a v e  ' a n '  a f f e c t  o n  t h e  a t t r i ­
b u t i o n  o f  r e n p o n s i b i l i  t y .  T h e i r  f i n d i n g s  s u p p o r t  t h e  h y p o t h e s e s  t h a t  
c l e a r  c o n d i t i o n s  w i l l  b o  m e t  w i t h  g r e a t e r  a t t r i b u t i o n  o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
t h a n  u n c l e a r  c o n d i t i o n s ,  a n d  t h a t  s e v e r e  o u t c o m e s  w i l l  ' o b t a i n  a n  
i n c r e a s i n g ,  a m o u n t  o f  r e s p o n s i  b i ' - i  t y  a t t r i b u t i o n  t h e  s e v e r i t y  i n ­
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creases. Pharos and "'11 son also found that thorn was a significant 
interaction between these two variable's. - Their results indicated that 
under ambiguous conditions there was no. relationship.between the attri­
bution of respunsibi1ity and the severity.of the outcome, but under 
structured (clear) conditions the attri butlon *?rf rosponsi bj.l ity in­
creases with the severity of the cons, quences.
In the present research no main effects- w«ro found, to operate 
(see Table V). Although .the attribution of responsibility for neg­
ative outcomes had a higher mean than that for r.ositivo outcomes, and 
the attribution of responsibility for severe consequences - had a. great­
er mean than that for mild consequences, as well as the mean for clear 
conditions exceeding the ambiguous conditions, the: fact remains that 
none of thes? were statistically significant. The differences were so 
slight as to coat doubt on earlier findings that these variables de­
termine: the assignment of res >:<nsibi 1 it.y.
The' ? hares .and V/ii.son findings that clear conditions fo.r a • n eg~.,
ative outcome will bo assigned increasing amounts of rosaonsibi1ity
to the person as . the consequences be-come nor.; severe ar-' not rvi rcct-
iy supported. ■ 1 t is true that the p. re sent study lies findlngo that sup-
- ort the notion that bevnr\e/ngative conditions receive the gr'-ntost
amount of'resp-on' -• ibi;- ity ?uhsign:v.ont to the person, -but how do u -
account for the' mil d /n <* g at 1 vo condition roc elvlug the least attri but ion
*
of r<-:sPonsibi !  1  ty ? ' t h e  standard d eviations ( ? , •  b !  c T V ) ,  for the two- 
variable analyses do su y-ort the Tec!way and Tow o. conclusion that 
nvariation in the novoro negative condition was nomowhat less than 
for each cf the remaining cond.itions" (bed wav' and T.owo, 1 9 7 5 :2-h3 ). 
bedway and T.c./o conclude support for th* Joiwe and .Bavin (19otN con­
tention that a;: trom "• negative- behavior contains, high information value 
about the actor, and the • finr!li-r s herein seem t.o bear this gain t also.
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kerb .svs the order ef foe t ’.vas not controlled .for as -well ac had boon 
assumed and after r*'ading- one story about the. actor, the subject b^- 
gan to develop some target based information. If- this were so the 
limited amount of .attribution of rosponsibili tjy1 to the actor under 
the cm oar/ncrot ive/n,;i 1 cl condition- and lie- ircr' a sod amoun. t und-or 
the cl». ‘ ar/ini 1 d /po si t i v ■: condition may be -accounted for. 'this being 
the case would support. ,,?als.t or ( 1 9 6 6 ) :i n. her conclusion that m v  ob­
server may feel 'sympathetic for an actor when an accident .results -in 
mild consequences,, but in line with the present results, -will not when 
the consequences a,re severe. I n . addition, it might be suggest that 
the logical.extension of this may have been provided support in the 
present research (i.e. that an actor will be given credit for a. mil d/ 
positive outcome because o f  ’’sympathetic" or empathic feelings to­
ward her).
A criticism of the present study is that-subjects were asked if 
they "had ever experienced a similar situation”', in an attempt to derive 
information concerning nego-invoJLvement”. Tt was previously mentioned 
that this aspect of the. research was' aborted due to the lack of pos­
itive response to this item, perhaps the question would.have been 
better phrased "can you relate .to the person in the story?!' To spec­
ulate, it rnight.be that the actual sample was highly ego-involved 
(as all were students), but they identified with the person and not 
the situation. This would affect their reactions to the story conditions. 
As. the' results show, more credit would be given the person for mild/- 
juositive outcomes., an.cl less responsibility would be attributed to the 
actor for mild/negative outcomes. The basic tenet of Talster*s attri- 
butional analysis would still hold true, however, that severr/nogativo
5k
conditions I '1 r c c o i v  the r ottrl button o f • r .a ■ ' onsibi 'ity
to the person as an' ipo-d • f;.usivo mancuv -r. Tnot rnvero/ o-o ti v' 
out c 0:0 os result in ; r r t u r  at t riba tier of rev oooibi 1.1 ty to. the- . 
actor* r 1 oo , contrary to the t.cvay o". ■ f l_//bl 011;-portion, is
■not ni : .-ortod by tls- r .-iPtr. Mar '0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 ,0 0 1 vith "’ad ol; r :i 0 tls 
ho tic a that s ovoro/aositi v-• r  ■: lev':: ;,o v/i"l.:. r-c :iv? situational attri­
butions. This suggests that people nay bo .w-i'}. li ny to assign respon­
sibility, or give er-lit 5 for /os.i tivo outcoi.vs, but v:hn they ore 
severely po cl tivo tlv> ott ri but ion to onvironmcnta] circuest&ncrs 
provides the observer with tv.: reassurance that similar "good for­
tune” coUld happen' to her'. L i . ; :  c - v / i s o ,  the obse rver may be v/i’’ l i  ny to 
grunt that mildly negative outcomes could befell anyone, but severe./ 
negative outcomes are bettor *s signed. t^ a' person to bl stinguirh 
the outcome as the resit’t cf "come other hind 0 1 . person” .
^igure I (pugc.f.9 ) clearly 'sup;, arts tire conclusions brawn here, 
hov;cvv;rv further exploratory research is in order to obtain evidence 
that supports the- contentions that ares being ,..uife* Thera:' findings 
arc unique in the literature, at the sane time in line v;j th' V. sister 
( 1 9 6 6 ) and partially with Medway and Lov/o ('1975)-. The present • study 
does not find support for any difference based on the clarity of 
the situation and. is consequent.ly in disagreement with ""hares and
4
L'ii. son ( 1 9 7 2 ) who wish' to support clarity as an important factor, 
in ' dispositional ' attribu.tions.
Table VII (rage h3) further indicator: that the difference between 
the ciear/mild/noFative condition and the severe/negative conditions 
was significant and that ,thftse did not occur n-^reOy by chance, peither 
did extreme . scores s e a  to affect -the results (v ~t.T?, sd-1.89).
F u r t h e r m o r e t h e  r e s u l t s  indicate that t h o  cl < • ur / ini Id/ p o  a i  t i v  - * 
c o n d i t i o n  w o n  s e e n  n o  s i g n i f i e a n t l y  m o r e  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  t h e  
p e r s o n  t h a n  t h e  s e v e r e / p o s i t i v e  c o n d i t i o n  ( s t o r y  n u m b e r  o n e )  o s  
. v e i l  r s  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  f r o  a  t h e  c o n d i t i o n  a t t r i b u t e d  t h e  
m o  s. t  r o s  p o n s  1 b 1.1. i  t  y  (o t o r  y  s  i  z )  *
Although the results su^g-ort the contention, of an tf ego - d o fen r,i v c 
.motivation on. the ...art of- the. sttributor, it is suggested hero that 
an analysis of variance be run to ado quately analyze- the"' data j n t-rni 
of what is a-c tua • ly going on i n . the interacts one that ' so obviously 
oporr.t r ( Gx.opk-1 ♦ ’"•long with the increased sophistication, o* f th;:)
analysi s procedure,' it-is surr est ed that whether. th-- s'reon j r ra'o- 
involved or not v/ith. the person in the story bo sore reliably checked 
A fiha3 criticise of the present study is that,' or ’'rdo/ay and 
, ov>o~ conclude in. their study also ( 1 >71: ItVl) > '’since jud^er'uot • e f 
responsibility involvso. a number of causa] ascriptions, plobal measur 
of responsibility tonb to be highly ambiguous and open to- the- inter­
pretive cagrico of subjects” .- :"hon examining: achievement re] a ted 'situ 
ations such as the ones in the 'present study, the stimilus.situution 
may be ambiguous by nature ,• vvhich is supported in that there was no 
main effect for the ambiguous vs. clear conditions.. Further research 
night include'a scale to check on the validity of the ambiguous vcrsu 
clear manipulation as tho results up to now s^sw rather inconclusive. 
On a more general level., tho 1 anguage of- the a ttributi.o.nnl tost in­
struments may require research and development of thoir own. erhaps 
■ the wording o f stories has as much to do v/ith the attributions ol :1 ci 
as do the mind sots of the subjects. If so, this would lend supfor I 
to the movement tov/ard vidcotar-..- tost imjtruiaeuis.. .
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